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At its sitting of 15 March 1973 the European Parliament authorized the
Committee on External Economic Relationa to draw up a report on economic and
trade relations between the European Community and JaPan.
At its sitting of 15 December L975, the EuroPean Parliament also
referred to the Committee on External Economic RelationB a motion for a
resolution by Mr Klepsch (Doc. 4A3/761 on trade between the EEC and Japan.
Ihe Committee on External Economic Relations appointed !1r BaaB rapPorteur.
and 26 January L977, the CommitLee on
the draft report. On 15 FebruarY
for a resolution.
present: l,!r Kaspereit, chairman; Mr Schmidt and I'lr l.lartinelli, vice-
chairmen; Mr Baaa, rapporteur; Mr Bayerl, Mr Bersani, Mr Didier, Mr Laban,
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AT,he committee on External Economic Relations hereby submits to the
European Parliament the follor,ring motion for a resolution, together wlth
explanatory statement
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on economic and trade relations between the European Community and JaPan
TIhe European Parliament,
- 
recalling its resolutions of 2 February 197o1 on trade relations betveen
the Six and Japan and 15 Decedber 1976 on comrnunity trade with Japan2 '
- 
having regard to the report of the Conunittee on External Economic Relations
(ooc. 570/76),
- 
having regard to the proposal for a resolution by llr Klepsch on behalf of
the christian-Democratic Group, on trlde between the EEC and Japan
(Doc.483/761t
1. Expre8aea ita deep concern at the constant growth of the community's trade
deficit with JaPan;
2. DrawB attentl-on to the alarming congequences to employment of Japanese
competition which concentrates on limited sectora of industries such as
shipbuilding and electronics and noteg the increasing regional imbalances
which result from these Japanese activitieE;
3. Calls upon the commission to examine and report to Parliament on the
methods whereby JaPanese exporters and financial houses penetrate variouE
markets in the community with a view to domination of those markets, there-
by infringing the rules of fair competition;
4. Feels that, in certain sectors, voluntary limitation of Japanese exPorts
to the Community is temporarily required;
5.Streeses,ho$reverthataeubstantialincreageinComrnunityexPortsto
Japan would play a key role in ending this trade deficit, and wclcomes
the fact that this view was ghared by the Heads of Government of the
community at the EuroPean council meeting of 29 and 30 November L976;
I O.l tto. c 25, 2A.2.Lg7o
2 oJ No. c 6, 10. L.Lg77, P- 69-
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6.
7.
8.
Requests the Commission to 8tron91y urge the Japanese Government to make
sulrstantial concesEione giving the industries of the EuroPean community
aecenE to the Japanese domestic market comParable to that enjoyed by Japan
to the Comrnunity market, and to ensure that the JatrEnese authoritiee Put
an end to the non-tariff barrLere to imports from ttre Community;
Welcomes the JaPanese Government's recent decision to simplify the
technical control procedure for motor vehicles and pharmaceutical
products from ttre Nine;
Notes that relations between certain t{ember States and Japan are still
governed by bilateral agreements and shares the view that the provisions of
theee agrcqmcnts may be applied only under the terms of the congnon trade
policy and only by the Conununity so that the cohesion of the Conununity
policy ie maintained and the free movement of goods within the cqnrnon
market is not jeoPardized;
Feele that queetiona of mutual interest and the differencea betl^teen
Japan and ttre Conununity ehould be resolved by common agreement on the
basis of the principle of freedom of trade;
l.O. Stresses the importance of continuing these consultations at parliament-
ary level and suggests, therefore, the inauguration of regular contacts
betrrreen delegations from the European Parliament and the JaPanese Diet;
11. Takes the view that, notwithstandilg the differences of opinion that
have arigen in recent years in the trade gector, the two partiee have
to face aimilar challengee and difficulties, which implies a communitlr
of lnhcretta i
L2. Hopes that, given this ccrilnunity of intereete, wideepread cooperatJ"on
will be possible between the two parties, especially in multilateral
matters (North-South dialogue and cAlT for instance) and also in the
areas of energy policy, research and pollution control;
13. Instructs its PreEident to for*rard this resolution and the report of
its comnittee'to the Council and Commission of the European Communities
and, for information, to the JaPanese Government and Parliament.
9.
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BEXPIAT{ATORY STAIIEITENT
l. By devoting trErt of its deliberations on 29 and 30 November 
1976 ar:
TheHaguetotheguestionofre]-ationsbetweentheCommunityandJapan,
the European council stressed the political nature which the 
growing
tradeimbalancebetweentheNineandJaPaniscurrentlyassuming.
According to Corununity estimates' by 3t December its deficit wiLl
havereached$4,2oomilIion.In1975itwaEonIy$3,2oomillion,although
tlris already ropresented an incroase of 6ffA ovet L974'
Thus,onceagain,relationsbetweentheCommunityandJapanarooJ'
current imPortance'
2.WhenpresentinghisreportontraderelationsbetweentheSixand
Japan (Doc. 212/69l during the February 1970 trErt-sessionl, your raPPorteur
stressed the importanee of this topic. Arthough, in the meantime' 
the
subject has been raised in Parliament on several occasions - during
QuestionTimeandmorerecentlyduringtheDecemberlgT6part-segsion,
when the oral question with debate put by lilr Osborn on behalf of 
the
EuropeanconservativeGroup(0-74/76,Doc.390/76|waedl..lcusged-
ecqrmicandtraderelationct,{ithi,aPanhavenotlreentheaubjectofa
full-rcale analysi's bti thc EuroP€an Parliament'
3.TheCommitteeonExternalEconomicRelationsfeelsthat,atatime
whonomployorgandtra<lounl.oneinthoNinoareclrawingtheattcntionclf
their governments and the Community authorities with gro,rring 
concern to
the alarming consequences' especially for employment' of Japa'nese 
com-
petitioninanincreasingnumberofareasofeconomicactivity,thereis
aneedtoreturntotheproblemofre]-ationsbetweenthetwoparties.
WithinthenecessarilylimitedframeworkofthisrePortweshall
attemPt,firstofall,tostudythestructureoftradebetweenthe
community and Ja5nn, then the reasons for the conununity's gronring
trade deficit vis-i-vis Japan, before going on to consider the 
possi-
bilitiesofachievingabettertradebalancebet\^leentwoareassofar
alnrt geographically, which' despite economic considerations and 
the
rivalrywhichcanmakethemcompetitorsinthesearchformarkets,are
closelylinkedbytheiradherencetotheprinciplesofparliamentary
democracY and freedom of trade'
I s." O.I No. L2L, Proceedings of 2 February 1970
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I.
4.TogetherwiththeUnitedStates'theEuropeancommunityandJaPan
constitute the world's greatest economic and commercl'al powers'
Duringthelg6ostheworldwatchedwitha&nirationandastoniehment
Japan,s extraordinary rise to Polirer which transformed this small archipelago'
with no naturar resources of its ovrn, into the world's third economic
Poh'er.Formanyyears,JaPanese.stytegrouth.hasbeensynonlrmouswith
economic miracles, t,ith record grcruLh' with increagog in produetion levels
to unprecedented heighte and extraordinary commercial vitality'
5. 1ftris system, based above all on freedqn of trade and capital at world
level,onunlimitedsuppliesofcheaprawmaterialsandonthesoundnessof
the international monetary system' guaranteeing stable rates of exchange
amongthemajorcurrencies,reacheditszenithattheendofthel95os.
TheNixon,shocks.oflgTlandtherestrictionsplacedonilatrunese
exports by the united states, the 1973 energy crisis (ilaPan imports 99%
of its oil), tHe lncrease in the price of all raw materials, the efforts
toEetuPanewworldeconomicordergearedmorecloselytothel.nterestg
of raw-materiar-producing deveroping countries, and the general pollution
of the archipelago brought home to JaIEn the vulnerabllity of its P@Ier
and the need to restructure its economy to make it less dependent on the
hazards of worldrvide fluctuations'
6.Inthisnewcontext,theEuroPeanCommunity'theleadingworld
economic and trade Powerr dssulled a special importance in the eyes of
JalEnese businessmen'
AlthoughtradebetweentheCommunityandJaPanhadbeengrorring
steadily throughout the 196Os, the leaders in Tokyo regarded it as
peripheraland,inthelastanalysis,ofsecondaryimportance.Japan.s
traditional trading partnerg, who took more than 50% of Jatrnn.s exports,
were the United States and ttre non-Comrnunist countries of South-East Asia'
7. Ttre structure of the community and of JatEn undoubtedly make their
econqnies appear conpetitive rather than comPlementary' EuroPeans and
JalEnese both live in areas where land is scarce, which are overpopulated
and which lack natural regources'
TomaintainemploymenEandlivingstandards'theyhavebeenobliged
to set up povrerful industries and to carry on a high level of trade with
the whole world. ltris competition for markets was inevitably aggravated
bytherePercusEtionsoftheenerg.ycrisis..[tresharpriseinthecostof
petroleumproductsandtheconqueetofmarketsinproducingcountries
wishing to industrialize rapidly have intensified ccrnpetition between
EuroPeans and Jatrnnese'
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8. Up until the beginning of the 197os the conmunity of the Six was,
for .fapan, a relatively unimportant trading Partner' It is true that
during this period, Community trade with Japan develoFd more rapidly
than with any other country except Libya. Betvreen 1958 and 1969 Community
imports from ,rapan increased by more than 45c/" and community exPort8 to
Japan by 35C/", although the initial figures \^tere very Lo^r'
g. Despite the considerable expansion in trade, the balance of trade
between the community and JaPan remained roughly in equilibrium, until
the beginnlng of the 1970s. Although Japan registered a surplus of
about $100 mitlion in 1965 and 1965 and $15 million in 1968, the balance
of trade during the other years was slightly in the community's favour'
10. From 1970 onwards
since then, EEC/JaPan
the Six and then for
1970
L97L
L972
t973
the situation changed considerably. Every year
trade has resulted in a grorring deficit, first for
the Nine.
This ie illustrated by the follovring figures:
The Communitv's trade deficit with Japan
(in millions of US dollars)
- 
276
- 
782
-L298
-134s
L974 -191s
L975 -3218
L976 
-420,0
(estimates)
Despite rapid growth, however, trade between the EEC and Ja;nn still
only represents a small percentage of their total imports and exports'
In 1975, the European community accounted for 10.2% of JaIEn's total
exports and only 5.8/" of its total imports'
The following table shows the overall figures for JaPan's trade in
L975 z
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TOTAL
USA
Canada
EBC
Australia
S.E. Asia
l,tiddle East
Iatin America
Africa
Ctrina
USSR
Exports
197 5(milIion Us $)
55,753
11,149
1, 151
5,675
L,739
L2,543
6,o75
4,765
4,o87
2,259
L,625
Imports
L915(million US $)
57,863
11,608
2,499
3,37 L
4, L56
10,585
L6,477
2,524
1,111
r,531
1,17O
100.0 2c-8 2L.6
Annual rate of
increase 1965-1975
Exports ImPorts
L6.2 L7.2
18. 3 2L.5
27.9 24.O
18.7 22.419.O 22.432.8 30.9
25-5 13.6
2L.t L9.2
24.9 2L.L25.5 L7.2
100.o
20.o
2.L
LO.2
3.I
.22.5
10.9
8.5
7.3
4.L
2.9
20.1
4.3
5.8
7.2
18. 3
28.5
4.4
1.9
2.6
2.O
%
In 1975.ralEn accounted for only 3.8% of the Corununity's total
lmporta and 1.8?6 of lte exports. ImporLs of JalEnese goods into the Nine
increased by L5% between 1974 and 1975 and during the first half of 1975
rose by 5% over the same period in 1975'
11. rhe authorities in Tokyo claim that Japan's trade surplus with the
community is offset by the large deficit caused by its invisible expendi-
ture.
According to Japanese figures, then, JaPan's trade surplus with the
Nine is largely offset by the deficit in Japan's invisible expenditure
($2,OOO rnillion in 1975, of which $1,500 million to the United Kingdorn)
so trade between the two parties is more evenly balanced. The level
of invisible expenditure deficit ie, however, unconfirmed.
L2. As the following table shows, Conmunity imports fron Japan consist,
for the moet part, of finiehed and seni-finished industrial products-
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Japan's foreiqn trade in 1975 bv countrv and reqion
Breakdown by product of Japanese exports to the
European Communitv
(% of ,ralue) 1
L973 1974 197 5
Capital goods
tltotor vehicles
Ships
Energy and steel products
Chemical products
Pharmaceutical products
Radios
TV sets
Textiles
Raw materials
Food
64
4.7
9.3
7.9
5.8
0.6
5.3
3.1
3.4
1.5
2.7
57
6.4
11.5
7.2
8.4
o.6
4.3
2.3
3.4
3.3
1.9
53
11.6
7.L
10 .2
5.5
0.5
5.0
2.O
2.9
2.4
1.9
1
The
one
sum of the columns exceeds I00 becauae some figures apply to more than
sector.
The breakdown by product of exports from the Nine to Japan is as
follows:
Breakdown bv product of Japanese imports from the Communitv
t973 L974 t975
Capital goods
Motor vehicles
Iron and steel Products
Chemical produets
Pharmaceutlcal Products
Textilee
Raw materials
Food
Consu[Er non-durables
Consumer durables
24
2.7
0.5
I9 .9
5.3
6.9
4.2
2.L
6.I
L3.2
25
2.7
o.97
21.5
5.0
6.5
4.3
3.1
7.O
t0
25.5
3.8
0.5
18.1
5.2
9.1
4.L
5.1
7.6
LL.2
13. A rapid examination of
trade between Japan and the
the above figures reveals that the structure of
European Community is in line with the high level
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of development attained by both economies: finished and semi-finished
products account for the greater part of trade, raw materials and
agricultural Products for only a very small percentage.
L4. As the figures show, Japanese exports aPPear to be fipre concentrated
around certain products than European exports: capital goods, motor
vehicles, ships and iron and steel accounted, in 1975,for a major part
of the uahe of Japanese exports, whereas Community exPorts are more diuersified
and more evenly epread. The imbalances in capital goods, motor eehicles -
Japanese exports wtrich have grown very rapidly in recent years - and iron and
steel products are particularly significant. Itris Pinpoints the principal
grievanceg expresEed by Community and national officials regarding Japanese
exports: their excessi've concentration on a few Products, upsetting
management estimates and creating serious sectoral employment problems.
An examination of a number of cases in point will help to highlight
the urgencY of the Problem.
- seger-vebislse
15. For many years Japanese motor vehicle production waa small. rn 1960
a m€re 165,0OO wer€ produced, whereae the figures for the Federal Republic
of cermany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy were 1,810,000, L'175,000,
1,354,000 and 596,000 respectirrely.
ilapanese production did not pass the million mark until L967. Eight
years later, in 1975, it had reached 4,500,000. sirn-ilar, though less
spectacular, increases vrere achieved in the case of commercial and
utility vehicles.
16. A striking breakthrough of this sort inevitably had rePercussions on
sales of Community vehicles (even though the European market has hitherto
been relatively insignificant by comparison with South-East Asia, North and
Latin America and, recently, the Middle East and Africa).
For many years the impact was indirect, with Japanese Production
competing with Community exports to third countries. But latterly it has
become direct, and JapaneEe cara now compete with Comnunity cars within
the territorY of the Nine.
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check that EuroPean cars conformed to Japanese quality standards, to
ensure better translation of safety regulations, to standardize
inspection Procedures and to use the production date of cars rather than
the date of lmportation into Japan as the reference date for the application
of new safety cheCks. Technical negotiations were oPened for this
purpose in May ]-976. Japan agreed to these demands, and as from
I April 1977 tests to ensure that cars exported by the Community conform to
,lapanese technical etandards will be carried out in EuroPe. A further
meeting was held in Tokyo on 13-14 January L977 to discuss nitrogen oxide
standards to be Lntroduced in Japan in 1978. The Corununity has requested
postponement of these measures until 1981.
ft ahould be mentioned that, as Part of the measures ProPosed on
25 November L976 by the alaPanese government to the CommissLon to offset
the trade imbalance with the Nine (a subject to which we shall return in
loore detail below), JaPan has agreed to hold the level of motor vehicle
exports to the United Kingdom at the 1976 level '
- 9lrpbvil9ug
ZA. The achleyements of the Japanese shipbuilding industry are even more
striking than those of the motor vehicle sector. Ttre remarkable Progress
ma<le by Japanese shipbuilders during the 1960s made Japan the leading
shipbuilding country with - on the eve of the 1973 crisis - about 5!% of
aII world orders. Since then orders haue been decreasing steadily as
a result of the overall slowing down of economic acLivity. A large number
of the ehips built immediately before Ehe 1973 crieis have not been put
l.nto servico. This situabion hae eharpenccl competiEion boEwoen variorts
ehipbutlding countrieg, and alnost all recent ordere have gone to Japanese
shipyards. According to information from EuroPean sources, which Tokyo
contectg , 74/" of the orders placed in the first half of L976 by the rieh
countries went to Japanese yards. It is claired that this rose lo 86%
in the firet nlne months of this ycar and is expected to lncreaee further
(.Tapan receiued 93% of the orders placed in september 1975).
21. This situation is clearly unaccePtable to competing countriea.
European countries are threatening to take unilateral aid measures if
Japan Coes not cut back production to the - in it.self very high - level
of the pre-crisis Period.
The reasone for the auccegs of Japanese shipyarde are easy to explain:
their pricea aro lower, in eomo caaos by aa l.rrr.r:lt au 1O')1,, Lllan tho86 ol'
their foreign competitors. Thie dlfference 1l largoly dua to
the efficiency, up-to-date methods and high standarde of Japanese shipyards.
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The negotiations which have been going on for several months within
OECD should enable the various parties to reach agreement on the sharing
of the orders expected to be placed between now and 1980. The Europeans
feel that orders other than those placed with third countries should
be shared more or less equally between ilapan and Europe. on its side,
the JapaneEe Government, realizing the dangers of a return to protectionisn
inherent in the current situationr should advise its shtpbuilders to
reduce their labour force in 1977 by 25% compared with 1974 and to achieve
a 65% reduction by 1980. However, 
-no 
decision has yet been taken.
Although lt feels that the problems outstanding should be resolved wlthin
the franrework of OECD, the Japanese Government is, nonethelese, prepared
to coneider at the bilateral congultations the apecial problens facing
the shipbuilding industry in the EEC. The first EEC-Japan bilateral
meeting hae already taken p1ace, in Tokyo on 2L-22 Decenber L976.
22. On I February 1977, during rehewed negotiationg in the OECD, the
JapaneBe authoritiea propoaed, aB a conciliatory meaEure, to increase the
e:rportpriceoftheirships'TtrismeaBure,previousrylimitedtoveesere
wlth a tonnage in excese of 2,5OO gross tong, will in future aPPly to ships
of all types and will remain in force until 3l December 1978.
Over the same period, the Japanese covernment will ask donestic ship-
yards to take specific measures to reduce their exporte to the European
countrieg most affected.
Japan also undertekes to reduce the activity of its shipyards if their
performance on the world market is Etill better than in the past.
According to Commieeioner Davignon, \dho has particular reaponsibility
for induetrial policy, the measureE proposed by the Tokyo Government could
provide a good bagig for furttrer negotiations bettreen the tr*o partiee-
- Iron and steel
23.- fhe Japanese iron and steel industry developed very rapidly during
the 1950s and at the beginning of ttre present decade. In 1973 Japan
became the world's second producer of eteel (120 million tonnes). Like its
European and American rivals, the Japanese iron and steel industry was
hlt hard by the L974-L975 receesion. During this period government
authorlt,ics lntroduced price control!. Thcse meaaures were lifted in
1975, and two prlce increaseg have occurrcd during the last few montha.
Despite this, the price of Japaneee cteel is still lower than that of
competing cDuntries. During the 1975 fiscal year (l,tarch 1975-March 1976)
101 million tonnes of steel was produeed, with 110 million tonnes expected
ln the present fiscal year. If it were working at full capacity, the
industry could produce 150 million tonnes, but slnce it is not, it is
obtiged to export come what may, in order to cover its costs. JaPanese
steel producers estimate that exports in the 1976 fiscal year - ending
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ir, t"r.t Lg77 -wiI1 reach 34 million tonnes (compared with 31.4 million
in 1975), of wtrich 6 mitlion tonnes will go to the United States and
4 million to the Middle , East.
2a. Aa regarde the EEC, the five largest Japanese grouPs (Nippon Steel,
Nippon Kokan, Kawasaki, sumitomo, Kobe steel) have agreed, since 1972,
to limit gales (to 1.2 million tonnes and then to 1.4 million in 1975)'
Until now ttre nlmcrou! ncdirm-sizcd lron and gteel producere ln
Japan have not, however, respected these agreementa. The resulting
competition hae added to the difficultiee df the Community lron and eteel
l-ndustry at a time when it is going through a very serious crisls (under
ECSC provigione, European iron and gteel producers can lreg their pricea to
those of their Japanete counterparts). At ttre beginnlng of autunur 1976,
the CommisEion drew the attention of ttre Japanese authoritiee to ttre problem
cau3ed by imports into the Community of sectiona and fine and special eteelg.
Ttria ie an ar€a in which Community producera are exPeriencing BeriouB diffi-
cultieg follovllng, in particular, the American authorities' decision to
introduce quotar for the irirport of special ateels into the United States.
British produeers of epecial steels, rdho, in the case of certain typea of
steel, are working at only 35% of capacity, have been Particularly hard hit
by these difficulties.
Since then Comnunity representatives have received assuranceE from the
Japaneae adminietration that not only large but aleo emall and medium-eized
Japaneao companies wiLl unilaterally limit exports to the Conununity.
- P3ll-!s35]!se
25. Atthough the problems discussed bel@, have had a far more limited imtrnct
than those dealt with in the preceding sections, your raPporteur feels that
they nonetheless serve to highlight the difficulties which uncontrolled
importe from Jatrnn can cauae for certain Community actlvities.
On 14 May 1926 representatives of BritiEh, German and French ball bearing
manufacturers' aasociations forx^rarded to the Commission a memorandum on the
threat to the European industry of low-priced imports, esPecially fron Japan.
t 
,r, June 1976, tire Conrnission drew the attention of the Japaneee
"or"rrr."rrt 
to the difficulties being experienced by ttris important and
particularly sensitive sector of EuroPean industry.
26. In autunn L976 a formal complaint was made by the committee of the
European agsociation of ball bearing manufacturers of the three countries
mentioned above, and the Comrnission decided to open an anti-dumping procedure
with regard to ball bearings and conical roller bearings from Japan.
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fhe plaintiffs claimed that, for 16 types of bearings, Japanese
export prices wcre 25 Eo 5C/" lower than thoso on the Japanese markct
and 5o?6 lovrer than European prices.
As a result, Japanese exports to the EEC had increased by 4@/" in
the case of barl bearings and by loofl. in the case of conical bearings
between 1974 and L976. Their share of the market was L7% for the former
and 5.3% for the latter type of bearing. since 1974 emplolment in this
sector had faIlen by 5,ooo in the three Member states in question. rn
reeent months imports from Japan have led to similar difficulties in the
Community screw-cutting and nut and bolt sectors.
27. By Regulation No. 26L/77 of 4 February 1977 (see oJ No. L 34 of 5
February 1977, PP 60 and 6l), the Commigaion, follollng the complaint made by
the Iittropean Aeaociation of Ball-bearing !,tanufacturer!, introdueed a proviEional
antl-tltrmplnty rlrtty on ball bcarlngr and tepcred roller bearinga and their partE
and sparea originatlng ln .r!pan.
Ttris duty will be of 20% and will supplement the normal duty of 9% Laid
dounr in the ccT. However, it will be reduced to 10% for products manufactured
and exported by the Nachi Fujikoshi and Koyo Seiko companies, for which the
level of recorded dumping vraE lorer.
Ttre preliminary survey carried out by the Commission Ehorls that imports
into the community of the products in queetion originating in Japan had
increased considerably, rising from 5,5OO tons in 1968 to 15,600 tons in 1974
and 19,OOO in L975, and that the margin of dumping, which varied considerably
from one tranEaction to another, sometimes exceeded 3O%.
ftre survey will continue during the three months for which the provisional
duty will be levied and the Council will then have to decide what final-
measureg are to be taken.
The Japaneee authorities have officially protested against the unilateral
meagures decided by the Commission, which, in their view, infringe the agree-
ment betlreen the two parties to settle differences on a bilateral baeis and in
a spirit of cooperation.
Mr Tatsuo Tanaka, Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry,
haa etated that his country will appeal against the Comrnunity'E decision to
the fnternational Court of ilustice in Ttre Hague.
-L7- PE 47.229/fln.
II. Itre causes of the Corununitv's qrcnrinq deficit
2g.. Tl5e gramples given above do not give an extraustive picture of the
Ccnnnunity sectors experiencing difficulties because of Ja1Enese imports,
but they do illustrate the problems which European and North American
busineEsmen face in dealings with their ,rap6nese counterparts: Japanese
penetratJ.on is concentrated on a few specific sectors, where it causes
large-sca1e disturbances for the corresPonding domestic operations.
T'he sectors concerned generally involve intermediate technology, since
the advanced industries which need extensive Programmes of haEic and
applied research are comparatively neglected by ,Iapan. In these branches
the JapaneBe create for themselves a privileged position and, in certain
caBeg, a genuine de facto monopoly, thanks to the high quality of their
goods, the rationalization of their production (the strongest and best
organized co[ntrEny is chosen from among the various competitors and itE
exports then enjoy facilities offered by the l(inistry for International
Trade and fndustry (lfITI) ) and the dynamic approach of their export
conpanies. Ttre effort to rationalize production has been further inten-
sified since the energy crisis and the recession of L974-75.
29. From ncru on, Japanese management has set itself the objective of
manufacturing in Japan the most sophisticated products - those for which
a minimum of raw materials and a qualified workforce are required and which
therefore produce very high added value. fhe industries in those sectors
whlch are slowing dorrn because they are labour-intensive are gradually
being abandonedr Eince they are facing the increasing competition of
products frqn developing countries where urage rates are lohr.
Textiles - whose share of Japanese economic activities is constantly
decreasing (Japan imports far more textiles, in particular from the EEC,
than it exports) - provide a typical example of this reatructuring policy.
30. Ttris does not mean, hourever, that ilapa.n has lost all interest in such
activities: Japanese investments, which have developed considerably over
the IEst few years (up to 1973 they totalled $Io,ooo million and by 1985
they should total $81, OOO million) , are being placed to a large exteat
in the developing countries, where the lol.r wage leve1s ensure a far
larger profit margin than in JaIEn. In this way, JalEnese capital con-
trols an increasing share of textile production in the South-East Asian
countries (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, I{acao, etc. ) ; and
Singaporo will be the baee for the develognent of ball bearing production -
eontrolled by Japanese capital. AIErt frcm low labour ooata, thcrG
countries also offer the advantage of benefiting from tariff preferences
granted by the industrialized nations, in particular the generalized
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preferences set up autonomously by the Community and other industrialized
nations. Thie new division of labour is therefore of obvious interest to
Japanese industry.
31. Furthermore, Japa.nese capital is being invested in couritries producing
raw materials (in the l4iddle East and Latin America, for example), which
enables it to influence the develoFment of these raw mateiials, and in the
industrially developed countries (Western Europe, United States) so as to
ensure outlets in these countries (the breakthrough in the sale of Japanese
cars in Europe may be explained by the setting up of subsidl-aries of
Japanese companies in the European countries), and so that it may benefit
from the technological innovations in their advanced industries.
32. of course, this st,rategy requiree tho centralieation of measures
under the control of the government and supreme admlnistration which set
the objectives and arrange the neeesaary finance.
This is facilitated by the close collaboration in Japan between
political circles, the supreme administration, the banks and the major
industrial companies, which are more closely linked than in Europe, and
by the Japanese decision-making proeedure, which provides for the important
decisions to be based on a consensus of all the interested parties rather
than the majority view.
33. A11 these methods taken together make for a very efiicient instrument
for the promotion of the JalEnese economy, and mean that MITI and those
responsible for the Plan can have every confidence that the objectives
they have set will, in fact, be attained.
34" A leading role in this strategy also devolves on the Japanese business
giants: the sogo shosha. Ttre six most powerful shosha 
- 
I4itsubishi Shoji,
l4itsui Bussan, ttarubeni Iida, C. Itoh, Sumitomo and Nissho-Iwai 
- 
deal with
half Japan's foreign trade. fhey have holdings in more than 5OO companies.
I4itsubishi Shoji's overseas staff alone is three times as large as that of
the Japanese Foreign l,Linistry. The foreign branches of the six companies
also constitute a better listening post than the information service any
ministry for foreign trade has anyrrhere in the worIdl. Moreover, these
large business houses are closely linked with the industrial groups built
around the six leading banks, which control two thirds of the capital of
JatrEnese companies and thus play a part similar to the zaibatzu of pre-
war Japan.
I rh" infor:nation on
'Soleils levants' the shosha was taken from a book by Tibor Mende(Editions du Seuil, Lg75)
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35. These giant conpanies - about ten in all -'conceive and organize
Japan,s international economic strategy and cover all existing products'
Vfith their tight network of more than a thousand branches and subsidiaries
in almost every country of the world and with the support of the large
industrial groups, which provide them htith products and know how, and of
the State, which protects them, they represent the most formidable commer-
cial tool in the world and participate in the three major areas of 'rapan's
world strategy: the export of manufactured goods; the utilization of
natural resources in the countries that have recently gained J-ndependence;
thesettingupoffactoriesincountrieswithlorwagerates.
3.6. Itrey enable the implementation of the 'orderly narketing' strategy,
the sharing of markets being helped by the coordination of the shosha,
which work in union, and of the export cartels of industries that are
encouraged bY the government.
Because of their sLze, they make it possible for certain branches of
industry to accept sacrifices for the overall good of the ilatrnnese economy'
fhanks to them, the system of voluntary export restrictl-ons mentioned above
can be imPlemented.
37. ftreir existence also explains why foreign exPorters - especially fron
the connunity - have eo much difficulty in penetrating the Japanese market'
unlese assistance is given by the shosha, it is very difficult to market
a forolgn product in Jalnn: in fact, glven tho links bott'eon them and the
major lndustrles and tho major Japanoso banks, thoro itl no roason why tltoy
should make an effort to make it easier for foreign products which compete
with the products of JaPanese industry to gain access to the Japanese
market.
38. The real heart
itors seems to stem
tribution. None of
of the problems between JaEEn and its western comPet-
from the very structure of JaSnnese industry and dis-
the western countries has any instruments comparable
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in efficiency with those available to Ja1Enese businessmen in these
fields. This explains why Community car manufacturers face difficulties
other than tariff and non-tariff barricrs whcn thcly try to penetrate t-ltc
,Japanese market, whereas their Japanese counterparts see their sales
increasing in Europe. It also explains the lack of comprehension which
frequently forms a barrier between Community and Japanese rePresentatives.
39. When the Community complains of excessive penetration by certain
Japanese exports and the barriers to imports of its products into Japan,
the Japanese reply, quite justifiably, that the difference is simply the
result of Japanese industry's greater efforts. In their view, Communlty
manufacturers ought to shovr more initiative in their efforts to gain a
foothold on the Japanese market by adapting themselves better to consumers I
demands and the sales methods peculiar to Jatrnn and by learning the
language of 11O million potential customers'
40. 'flro Tokyo authoritioa eay that it is quite unjust to accuse their
counLry of oxeoseiv6 proLoetlonlem. Tlro ,Tapttttt!trt (-'tlrlL()n$ lari I'f wan lowcrod
by 2C/" across the board in December L972, and overall, it is not much lrj<;l]er
than that of the Community (average level of the Community's customs tariff:
7%t of Japan: 9.8/"1. At Present, Japan imposes import restrictions on
onLy 27 products (22 agricultural, 5 industrial), whereas in 1975 France
imposed restrictions on 59 produets (32 of them industrial), Ireland 56,
ftaly 54, the United Kingdom 41, Benelux 31, the Federal RepublLc 27
and Denmark 14. Italy and Belgium apply these restrictions only to JatrEn'
Itre other countries aPPly them to several third countries.
In addition, on 1 l,tay L973, Japan decided on complete liberalization
as regards foreign investment, with the exception of 5 industries which
remain subject to particular regulations, and t7 others which will gradually
be opened up to foreign competition over three years'
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III.
4I. Given the world situation at the end of L976, the interests of the
community and Japan appear, when all is said and done, to be similar
rather than dissimilar. As we have seen at the beginning of this rePort,
both must face up to the same Problems and the same difflculties: small
territorial area, lack of rav, materials, wealth created by the manufactur-
ing and processing operations of an active and hardworking population,
the need to find outlets to ensure fuII employment, the financing
of imported raw materials, and the restructuring of existlng industries.
42- Slnce baslc intereats are the satrle, rivalrieg and dirparitiee,
although ser:Loua, ahould not be overestLnated. We bclieve that thLe should
be the basis for a consideration of ways of achieving a better balance
in trade bet\ireen ila5nn and the Community' :ftris can be done
- 
elther by restrlcting unilaterally (quotas, safeguard clauses) or by
contractual means (voluntary limitation proeedures, gentleman's agree-
ments) the access of ,rapanese Products to the community;
- 
ofr despite the difficulties we have mentioned, by increasing eomnunity
exPorts to JatEn.
After considering the various possibilities, we shall suggest oPPor-
tunities for cooperation between the th'o parties in an increasing number of
sectors.
1. gsrls!e=l-59E!5r9!less-e3-!rsgg
43. llost European countries suffered a traumatic shock between the wars,
when world markets were flooded by large numbers of JaPanese products
which were frequently mediocre in quality and cheap because of lol'r labour
costs.
Therefore, when JatEn regained fult sovereignty after the American
occupation and attempted to re-establish trade llnke wlth the rest
of the world, most countries were obviously wary of opening up their
frontiers to JatrEnese Products-
When Japan became a member of C,ATT in 1.955, France and the Benelux
countries lnvoked Article :OO$/ of the General Agreement (exclusion from
preferential treatment). In 1963 these countries withdrew their objection
and agreed in exchange on a safeguard clause with .lapan. 'ftre United
Kingdom also benefits from such a clause. The Federal Republic of Germany
and ltaly, which had not invoked Article IOOG/ in 1955, have no lega1 basis
on which to exclude JaIEn from the benefits of the GATT preferential
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system. However, the countries in question rarely take advantage of the
safeguard clause.
44, To give their trade with .lapa.n a contractual basis, the Member States
of the EEC concluded bilateral trade agrconents with that country
drrring the 'l96Os. These agreements governed the entry of Japanese goods
into the Six, and horp liberal they were depended on circumstances and the
Member State concerned.
On 1 January 1970, when trade policy became a Community matter, the
problem immediately arose of economic and trade relatione between the EEC
as such and JaPan.
45. A Council decision of 9 October I96t l-aid down that the duration of
trade agreements concluded by the tilernber States might not extend beyond
the end of the transitional period for the application of the Treaty' In
January 1969 the Council adopted a decision authorizing the tacit extension
beyond the end of the transitional period of certain trade agreemente
concluded by the Member States with third countries. In JuIy of the same
year the Commission proposed a similar tacit extension of agreements entered
into with JaIEn.
46. In October L969, the Council agreed in principle to the opening of
exploratory talks between the Community and JaPan, with a view to con-
cluding an overall trade agreement between the two parties. Following a
visit to Tokyo by the Commissioner then responsible 
-for. Community External
Relations, Mr Deniau, the Corunission forwarded in March L97O, a rePort
to the Council which stressed the interest of both Parties in normalizing
their trade relations and in strengthening their economic cooperation.
47. In JuIy I97O the Council authorized the Commission to open trade
negotiations with Japan on this basis. These were begun in September L97O,
the aim being to achieve gradual, reciprocal and balanced liberalization
at as high a level as possible in trade between the two countries. However,
the EEC stated its wish to include in the terms of the agreement a safe-
guard clause valid for all the Member States. It very soon became obvious
that such a demand was unaccePtable to the JaPanese negotiators.
4e. After a second round of negotiations held in Brussels at the beginning
of July 1971, it was clear that no agreement would be possible between the
t-wo dologaLlona on Ltri,s polnt-. 'I'he problenr was raisod ar;aln whon tho
president of the Commission, Irir lilalfatti, and then Commleslonor Dahrotrdorf
visited Tokyo in L972.
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49. A short tl-me later, hourever, the new President of the Commission,
addressing the European Parliament on 13 February L973' referred to the
EEC's anxiety in the face of the gro^ring imbalance in its trade
with Japan and the dangers that a situation of this kind entailed for
emplolzment or regional balance, 'which explains the importance attached
by the community to the establishment of safeguard measures' .
With the disagreement continuing, both parties felt that before the
talks on the negotiation of an EEC-Japan agreement were resumed, it would
be wise to await the outcome of the multilateral negotiations in GATT
(the 'Tokyo Round'), during which an international solution might be found
to the problem of the safeguard clause.
50. fhat is hovr things stand today. Ttre result is that the bilateral
agreements between Jatrnn and the nine Member States of the Community
(a gentleman's agreement in the case of Denmark, while the other eight
countries have trade agrecments) are still in force seven years
after the end of the transitional period. ftre validity of these agree-
ments is extended year after year by Council decision. Ttre rules
governing the entry of Japanese products therefore vary from one Member
State to another, which in certain circumstances results in Article 115
of the EEC Treaty (measures designed to prevent deflection of trade
between ltlember States) being invoked.
51. Coordinated action at Communlty level needs to be taken in this
respect. ft is encouraging that the Community is arguing the case that
the safeguard clauses of certain bilateral agreements may be applied
only under the terms of the comrpn trade policy and only by the Community.
ftre considerable increase in the trade deficit between each of
the nine Member States and Japan and the employment crisis have, however,
made the Member States ahlare of the strength of a united front, and it
is a welcome sign that recently the Community countries have reglly
acted together in their relations with ilapan.
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It should be emphasized that in certain sectors - the liberalized
products and textiles, for example - the Comrnunity has already adopted
a conmon position. One agreement has just been concluded (see OJ No. L 2I9,
12 August 1976) between the EEC and Japan on trade in textiles and
another on the voluntary limitation of Japanese steel extrrorts.
52. Reference has been made (see point 38) to the different degrees of
Iiberalization achieved by the Member States vis-i-vis JaPan and vice
versa.
These restrictions are of relatively minor importance and have
mostly been inherited from the Past. t'heir existence hampers, in parti-
cular, attempts at multilateral level to achieve a general liberalization of
rporld trade, ald to obtain rtrade pledges' from all the leadinq Wtstern econ-
6nd,e powers, al also the undertaking to have minimum recourse to
protectionist measures.
53,. Nevertheless,, your raPporteur considers that the Community should
be able to protect itself, in certain specific sectors, from the dangers
implicit in excessive dependence on third countries, and should safeguard
employment and regional balances where these are threatened by exorbitant
volumes of imports. Indeed, the worsening of these probloms in certain
sectors has recently led the Commission to ask the Japanese Governncnt
to- linit its exPorte.
z.9gse!ss--qglsgJ-t3-t-i9s-!-"Evg93-!h9--tv9-Pgr!-i9g j
54. 1lltrere is no doubt that one of the best ways of staving off such
unilateral restrictions would be through talks and cooperation between
the parties concerned. There is thus a clear need for regular and
institutionalized contacts between the Community and Ja[Enese authorities.
Such talks could naturally be held within specialized international
organizations (6ATT, oEcD), or during important multilateral negotiations.
As was mentioned above, the current talks between the JaPanese and their
European competitors on the sharing of orders placed with the shipyards
of the parties concerned are being held within the framework of the OECD.
55. It was with this in mind that, at the Paris Summit Conference
on 19 and 20 October Lg72, the Heads of State and Government declared
that the Copnunity was determined to 'contribute ... to the progressive
decontrol of international trade based on reciprocity and aimed at
tariff and non-tariff barriers' and to 'carry on constructive dialogue
with Japan ... with an open mind and exploiting appropriate
vehicles' .
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Following this declaration of intent' the EEC antl Japan agreed in
lgT3thattheirproblemsshouldbesolvedthroughdiecussions'witha
view to consolidating and strengthening existing friendly relations'
To this end, 'constructive talks should be held regularly on the major
issuesofcommoninterestatbothministeria}tevelandthelevelof
experts,(jointcommuniqu6drawnupfollowingthevisittoBrusselsby
Mr Ohira, at that time Japanese Poreign Minister' on 4 May 1973) '
56. The first of these regular high-level discussions was held in
Brussels in June Lg73, and they have subsequently taken place every six
months (the 9th meeting was held in Brussels in mid-November 1976) '
since 1g65 similar information meetings have also been held between
Japan and the community authorities to discuss the areas covered by the
EcscTreaty.concurrentlywiththeseinstitutionalizedcontaets,
.Community_JaPanrelationshavebeenconsiderablydevelopedbythefrequent
visits by the commissioners responsibre to Japan and by Japanese officiars
to BrusseIs. rtre chairman of Keidanren (the Japanese employers' organiza-
tion) also visited senior Community officials in october L976'
5T.TheCommunityshouldthereforemakeamajorefforttoprovidemore
information,andprorrotetradeandcontacts.ThepresenceofaCorrunission
delegationinTokyosincelgT4maymakethiseasier,althoughitwould
beadvisabletoincreaseitsscopeforactioninthecomingmonths.
58. In this connection, your rapporteur wishes to stress the advantages
tO be clorlVoCl, ln lrlg Vl6W, l-tat-tttt r.tfrtalrl Itllrltlr; t'rtr;t1lfll' ('rrrll'ar-l n lrtrtWenn A del'
egettqn frorn the Eurolrean Parllament and a delegation from the Japenese DleL'
Such meetings have already been held for several years with national
and multinational parliaments, and it is common knorrledge that, particularly
in the case of the United States and Canada, these informal exchanges of
views on the major issues of the day provide a clearer insight into the
respective positions of the parties concerned and the reasons for their
actions, and have proved, in the final analysis, of undoubted value'
In the early 197Os, a delegation from the European Parliament \^'ent
to Tokyo at the invitation of the Diet. It would be most useful if, in
the coming months, at a time when EEC-Japan relatiOns are assuming new
dimensions and face serious problems, a delegation from the Ja[Enese
DlrtcouldpayarGturnvlllttol,uxcmbourgorstrr.boulgrtndlf
rogular m€!6Llngs lrol-wr:r.rr Llrr-. Lwr.r Pur:l lanl(-tnlll, rrl il t't'(r(ltlrrllcy I {l lrn tlnl'irlrrtl,
could thenceforth be arranged.
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;8.. Such contacts have so far prevented the divergences between the
Community and Japan from becoming too acute. fhey provided the framcrork
for the 'negotiations' on the voluntary reductions by JaPan of some
exports to the Community. As we know, the EuroPean Council recently
requested the relevant Cornmunity authorities to Pursue these discuseions
with the JalEnese authorities with a view to smoothing out existing
difficulties between the two parties.
60. The Japan€s€ Qevsgrunenl, for its part, is aware of the problems
which might result from an excessive influx of Japanese goods into
certain countries and of the danger of economic reprieals and has for
several years consequently taken a number of measures - under its
'orderly marketing' policy - to check Japanese exports.
The object of this policy is to make Japanese undertakings and
groups of undertakings aware of the importance of maintaining an orderly
approach to export-s. To this end, the government carefully studies
export trends in each product and each market, with a view to detecting
as rapidly as possible any souree of potential friction abroad and
advising the business circles concerned accordingly.
61. If euch friction ariaea, MfTf ean issuo d.iroctivee ordorinq ex-
porters to break up an oxport cartel, and eompel any exporter of the
product concerned to place his exports under governmental control. Ihis
is an extremely effective instrument, given the very close relations
between business and government circles to which we have referred above.
52. Over the last few years there have been numerous instances of
measures being prepared by JatrEnese industry, either independently or
after consulting the corresponding European industries, with the aim of
limiting imports of Jatrnnese products into the Community or controlling
them by some other means, tErticularly with regard to prices and quality.
Ttrese practices have been criticized by the Commission (see Opinion
on imports of Japanese products into the Community falling under the Treaty
of Rome, oJ No. 1Il, 21 October L972) on the grounds that, under Article 85 (1)
of the EEC Treaty, 'aII agreements between undertakings ... and concerted
practicee whlch may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, reetriction or distort.ion of compe-
tition within the ecnunon market' are prohlbited as incompatible with the
conunon market. The fact that several or all of the undertakings concerned
may have their registered offices outside the Corununity does not preclude
the application of this decision, insofar as the agreements, decisions
or concerted practiies affect the territory of the conunon market.
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The cOmmission's cautious attitude towards agTreements between under-
takingsisthusunderstandable,.astheymayrePresentaseriousobstacle
to free competition, the free movement of goods and uniform pri-ces through-
out the conmon market countries'
63. No such risk is invorved, however, in reciprocar voluntary limitation
agreements negotiated between the Conuniesion and the .,aPanese authorities
which represent the most effective instrument for settring possible disputes
between them.
At a coREpER neeting on 17 June !976, Mr Hijzen, Director-General
forExternalRelationsatthecomnissionoftheEuroPeanConurrunities,
statedthatvoluntarylirnitationmeasureswerebynatureanintegral
partoftheccrrunontradepolicyandshouldnotcallintoquestionits
uniformltythroughouttheCorurrunity.MemberstateBshouldthererore
refraLnfromtaklnguPcontactswiththirdcountriesbutshould'in
appropriatecaaes,informtheCorununityauthoritiesofpotentialdiffi-
cultiessothattheycouldactinclosecontactwiththenationalautho.
rities and defend the interests of the conurunity effectively and rapidly'
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64.Abalancecouldbeachievedincomnunity.Japantradebyrestricting
JaPaneseexPortg,andehouldbeachlevedbyprorrotingcomnunityexports
to.,aPan.TheEuroPeanCouncithagrecentlystreseedtheimportanceit
attachee to an increaee i'n exports'
we have mentioned above the numerous problems which hamper this
development: the Particular structure of distribution in Japan' non-
tariffbarriers,theignoranceofwesternbusinessmenoftheJalnnese
mentalitY, etc.
55. success cannot, hGlever, be guaranteed without the cooperation and
goodwilloftheJaPaneseGovernment.InlgT2-lgT3itrecognizedtheneed
to increase its foreign purchases and at one stage there \das some Progress
in this field. since the recession of Lg74-75, the trend has again been
reversed. Tokyo believes that the recovery at the beginning of 1976 has
yet to be consolidated. During the last two years, the JatrEnese standard
of living has dropped, together with internal demand for consumer and
capital goods. For several months the Western [Ertners have been requesting
tho Japanese Government to launch an oxPangion policy which would benefit
Community exports. 1fhese rePresentations have not yet produced any concrste
results.
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65. However, the increase in the Community,s trade deficit and the
threats of a reversion to various protectionist measures have recently
led the Japa.nese authorities to make a number of specific proposals with
a view to increasing Japan's purchases in the Community countries.
In reply to the Commission's requests at the high-level consulta-
tions in November L976 that the groruth of the JatrEnese trade surplus should
be brought to a halt, Mr Yoshino, Deputy Irlinister for Foreign Affairs,
recently stated in a letter to Conunissioner Gundelach that his country was
prepared to increase its import quotas in a nrrmber of sectors. He mentioned
an increase in the guota for skiruned milk powder for cattle in the second half
of the 1976 fiscal year (up to 55,000 tonnes or more if neceesary), and in
contracts for imports of standard butter. Furthermore, Japan is considering
ending the ban on imports of French processed meat and, in this connection,
a veterinary inspector will shortly be sent to France. Import procedures
for manufactured tobaceo products will at last be simplified and the number
of brands of manufactured tobacco produets increased.
As stated above, JatEn has also taken a number of measures to facil-
itate technical inspections of motor vehicles and pharmaceutical products
imported from the Community,
ftrese measures, although of limited scope, represent a step in the
right direction, and we may reasonably hope for further progress in this
sector in the coming months.
4. Closor s 9ep9 13 ! r 9! 
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67. Past developments have above all reflected the divergences between
consider only thisthe two parties. It would be quite \^rrong, however, to
negative aspect of the situation.
68. The two parties' positions in the important multilateral negotiations
(Tokyo Round, UNCTAD, IIIF, North-South Dialogue) are similar, for they share
conrmon interests.
Japan and the European Community are in a comlErable situation with
regard to their relations with the United States: military dependence and
de facto economic solidarity, even if this does not preclude occasional
conflicts of interest and rivalries in various sectors. Tokyo and the
European Community have also adopted broadly similar positions with regard
to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
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Japan is novr considered as one of the three pillars of the Western
world (Europe, United States, Japan). Ttris position, which derives from
its considerable economic power, bestorps upon it the right to take part
in meetings of the leading Western Heads of State (meetings in Rambouillet
and hrerto Rico).
69. this de facto solidarity should make it easier for Europe and Japan
to cooperate on a wide scale. T'hus, during }tr Ortoli's official visit to
,Japan in February 1974, emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen
cooperation between the two parties in the fields of energy and research
and development, particularly with regard to alternative sources of energy
and atqnic po\iler.
?O. A rough framework for cooperation in these sectors already exists
at bilateral level: Franco-r7aSnnese mining of uranium deposil-q in Niger;
projected pa.rticipation by Tokyo in the uranium enrichnent plant con-
structed by the Eurodif Group; agreement concluded with France on the
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels.
Such projects should be encouraged, given the obvious advantages
which they afford both parties.
7L. This cooperation between European and Japa.nese technology and
capital could also encomtrnss Lhe development of new sources of energy,
off-shore oil prospecting, the exploitation of new sources of raw materials
in third countries and the fight against pollution. It could take the
form of joint ventures in sectors where the profitability of investment is
not certain.
72. Ttre examples given above serve merely to sholrr the considerable
opportunities which exist in this field. As $re have shown throughout
this report, public opinion and the Community authorities should not let
themselves be deceived by the present unresolved disputes bet\ileen the
Community and Japan. Differences of opinion naturally exist in important
sectors, and in the present period of econonic crisis in all countries,
they appear.more serious than before.
Your rapporteur has emphasized throughout this report his belief
that these differences should be solved by regular consultatilcn, and not
by unilateral and authoritarian meaeures, which, as one reprisal sets off
another, would lead the Western world down the slippery slope of protection-
ism. A solution should be found through consultation to the problem of
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the excessive concentration by the Japanese on certain exPorts to the
Community.s5:nilarly,theprocedureforfacilitatingtheaccessof
Corurrunity undertakings to the .Tapanese market and, as a result, increasing
our exports to JaPan, should be implenented by mutual agreement'
ThemeetingoftheEuropeancouncilinTheHagueexpressedthehope
that considerable progress would be made before the next meeting (scheduled
for 25 Irilarch Lg77) and that in that time the Japanese authoritiee and the
relevantCommunityauthoritiesmightbeabletoeo}vetheproblernewhich
have arisen over the last few years between the two parties'
YourraPPorteurearnestlyhopesthatreasonandcolullonsensewill
duly prevail and that, despite their current divergences, JaPan and the
Communitywillrecognilzethefactorswhichcloselyunitethem:acommon
attactsnent to representative democracy and the basic principres of free
world trade (trade pledges, rejection of protectionign) ' all of which have
been subscribed to within GATT and reaffirmed repeatedly since then' both
intheoEcDandattheperiodical'Summits'oftheHeadsofStateand
GovernmentoftheprincipaleconornicPowersofthewesternworld.
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Statement adoPted
30 Uovember L975
at the meeting of
on relations with
ANNEX
the EuroPean Council on 29 and
Japan
lrheEuropeanCouncilstressestheimportanceitatt'achosto
themaintenanceofgoodrelationsbetweentheCommunityandJalnnand
itsprofoundhopethat,theserelatl.onswilldevelopbothtothebenefit
of the CommunitY and JaPan'
ThoEuropeanCouncilnoteswithconcorntheeffectsoftheimport:
and export practices Pursued hitherto by Japan' the sv'ift deterioration
in the trade balance between the Community and JaPan and the 
problems
whichhaveemergedincertainimportantindustrialsectors.Decisive
effortsareneededtoremedythissituation\tithsPecialattentionfor
the increase of the community,s exports to Ja;nn in order to 
establish
mutually advantageous trade relations'
TheCouncilthereforecallsupontherelevantCommunityauthorities
to Pursue most urgently this important asPect of the common 
trade poliry
indiscussionwith.ratEn.rtiscountingonnotabreProgressbeingmade
beforeitsnextmeetingonthesolutionswhichareurgentlyneededin
order to reach the Community's aims'
TtreEuropeancouncilnotesh,ithsatisfactionthattheilatrraneae
GovernmentispretrnredtocooperatewiththeEuropeanCommunityona
basisofmutualunderstandinginsolvingtheprobtemswhichhavearisen.
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